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LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHARES TO
LEGAL PROCESS
PIERRE R. LoISEAUX*
Judgment creditors have a persistent problem of collecting
money. In the case of individuals, much of today's wealth is protected
by exemption statutes. The residence of a debtor is protected from
his creditors by statute or the concept of the common-law estate by
the entirety. The homestead is exempt to some extent in all states and
completely exempt in a few.' Various personal property exemptions
are found in all states, some limited by total dollar amounts and
others limited only by the nature of the property. 2
One type of wealth which is not included in exemption statutes is
ownership of shares in a corporation.3 Because of the vastness of
wealth represented by this type of ownership, it is important that
creditors in all states have a uniform method of levying or attaching
corporate stock. As was said by Judge Lloyd in a New Jersey case:
Shares of stock are now possibly the most widely prevalent form of title to
joint interest in property, and their certificates are to the possessor the evi-
dence of his right. As is commonly known, millions of shares are transferred
daily from one owner to another, and in the stock exchanges of the country
comprise perhaps the major part of their transactions. On small pieces of
paper are written the evidence of fortune. It is therefore of great importance
that these titles should rest upon a sure foundation.4
Ownership of shares in corporations is represented by pieces of
paper called certificates of stock. These certificates may be in the
actual possession of the owner, or pledged to a lender, or in a safety
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. LL.B. 1950, Boston University;
LL.M. 1951, New York University.
I. See generally S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 230-
50 (1967).
2. Exemptions are quite common for clothing, household equipment and furniture, tools
of trade, automobiles, insurance, and numerous government benefits, both state and federal.
For an excellent discussion of these matters, see Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in
Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678 (1960).
3. The greatest segment of this wealth is represented by ownership in large national corpo-
rations. The certificates representing this wealth are traded daily on national exchanges. An-
other large ownership group is represented by shares which are registered but not listed on
national or regional exchanges. These securities are traded on the "over-the-counter" markets.
A further group of ownership interests of unknown size are unregistered shares in small corpo-
rations which may be owned by a single family or a group of entrepreneurs.
4. Wallach v. Stein, 103 N.J.L. 470, 472, 136 A. 209, 210 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
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deposit box or in innumerable other physical situations. Whatever the
physical situs of the certificates of stock, the wealth represented by
these certificates should be available to the creditors of the owner. If
the piece of paper itself represents the wealth, then the judgment
creditor must somehow get possession of the certificate. If, however,
the ownership interest is the wealth, then the judgment creditor must
utilize a procedure enabling him to collect upon the intangible chose
in action. Unfortunately for the judgment creditor, both views of the
nature of the wealth represented by ownership of shares in a corpora-
tion prevail and have prevailed for many years.
If the piece of paper is the res, what procedures are available to
the creditor? Assuming that the debtor has the certificate in his
pocket, can the sheriff levy execution upon the paper by removing it
from the pocket of the debtor? If the certificate is pledged, what
process will reach the certificate or the debtor's interest therein? Is
garnishment available against the lender or the broker? Can legal
process get the certificate out of a safety deposit box? Does it make
any difference if the certificate is in the name of a street address or
if the debtor has fraudulently conveyed it to another who is now in
possession? Are there other remedies available to the creditor, such
as a bill to reach and apply or supplementary proceedings?
If the certificate is not the res, the creditor must then concern
himself with the place of incorporation of the issuer of the shares.
What procedure must be followed in that place? If the shares may
be taken without obtaining possession of the certificate, what is the
status of a subsequent bona fide purchaser of those certificates in the
ordinary course of business? If a certificate is taken and it does not
represent the ownership interest, can it be used to satisfy the judg-
ment?
If a single state or nation persists in creating shares that are not
embodied in a certificate, can the creditor safely proceed without first
knowing the situs or the de facto situs of the corporation which issued
the stock? Will the procedure to be followed by the creditor be deter-
mined by whether the ownership interest is a "security" within the
meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code?5 If the interest sought is
not a "security," then what law governs the reaching of that interest
and what procedures must the creditor pursue?
This article will attempt to answer most of the questions concern-
5. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102(I).
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ing creditors' remedies posed in the above paragraphs. After briefly
reviewing the common-law methods by which creditors reached own-
ership interests in corporations, the discussion will center upon legis-
lative attempts to provide for uniform answers to these questions
through the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. However, in some instances, where there is no legislative
or judicial solution, this article can only suggest answers to these
questions.
COMMON LAW AND PRE-USTA STATUTES
At common law the ownership interest in the legal fiction called
a corporation was classified as an intangible chose in action and was
not subject to legal process.' Thus, the only procedure available to
reach ownership interests in corporations was the creditors' bill.7 It
was also customary in some areas not to issue any certificate evidenc-
ing shares of stock in a corporation. When certificates were issued,
their existence was not related to the actual ownership of the shares.
The corporate books were the sole and controlling evidence of
ownership.'
The first step leading to the recognition of the certificate of stock
as evidence of a corporate ownership interest was the enactment of
statutes subjecting the certificate to legal process. This was done in
the middle of the nineteenth century by most states.9 At the same
time, some statutes made the issuance of certificates a requirement
for all corporations. 0 The legal process selected by the legislatures
at that time was levy by notice to the corporation. Under this process,
the creditor obtained a writ of execution, attachment, or garnish-
ment, and the sheriff made a levy under that writ by leaving a copy
6. At common law . . . shares of corporate stock, being intangible and incapable
of physical seizure, and not being debts due and collectible from the corporation at the
stockholders' will, were not the subject of attachment and levy . . . . Elgart v. Mintz,
123 N.J. Eq. 404, 406, 197 A. 747, 749 (Ch. 1938).
7. A creditor's bill is a suit by a judgment creditor in equity for the purpose of reaching
property which cannot be reached by levy and sale under an execution at law. See Newman v.
Willetts, 52 III. 98 (1869).
8. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 355 P.2d 481, 7 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960).
9. Law of the 1805 May Session, 689-90, [1805] Conn. Laws (superseded 1848); Law of
March 22, 1872, §§ 52-54, [1872] III. Laws (superseded 1894); Law of March 9, 1842, § 5,
[1841-45] N.J. Laws (repealed 1948).
10. Law of May 20, 1861, ch, 82, § 14, [1861] Cal. Laws (codified at CAL. CODE CIv. PRO.
§ 541 (West 1955)); Law of April 29, 1874, P.L. 73 § 17, [1874] Pa. Laws (codified at PENN.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1601 (Supp. 1972)).
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with one of the principal officers of the corporation. Statutes nor-
mally spelled out in some detail which officers were to be served with
the process and the proper place for service. The sheriff would then
proceed to sell the interest to the highest bidder at public sale. The
corporate officer made a certificate of sale to the purchaser who
would be issued a new certificate for the appropriate number of
shares, and the outstanding certificate in the hands of the judgment
debtor was made void and cancelled.
This pre-Uniform Stock Transfer Act period was favorable to
creditors, for under the levy by notice system the creditor was certain
to obtain the debtor's interest in a corporation, unless the debtor sold
or assigned his interest before the creditor served the writ. Problems
were encountered, however, when the state of incorporation and the
domicile of the debtor were not identical. Under the levy by notice
process, the creditor was required to go into another jurisdiction to
enforce his judgment and, thereafter, the collection rights. The stat-
utes in this period gave no protection to purchasers and lenders be-
cause under the levy by notice process they could not be sure that they
were buying a good title in the stock without checking the records of
the corporation before making the purchase or loan. As a further
complication, the prospective purchaser or lender, not being a stock-
holder, had no legal right to examine the records of the corporation."
THE UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT
As the number and value of corporate shares grew, pressure to
provide protection for purchasers and lenders became greater. It was
not practical in a business sense to make an investigation before
purchasing or lending. The enactment of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act 2 did not solve this problem, since corporate shares
were ownership interests rather than fixed obligations and thus were
not within the definition of negotiable instruments. Action which
would enable the purchaser to take a certificate, regular on its face,
and be assured of a good title was needed. With this background, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws decided that the best solution
was to give negotiability to the certificate evidencing ownership in the
corporation.
II. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 355 P.2d 481, 7 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960).
12. For the text of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, see 5 UNIFORNI LAWS ANN.
(1922). The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act was adopted by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1896 and was subsequently enacted in every jurisdiction.
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Thus, the Commissioners adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act (USTA) 13 in 1909. The USTA gave stock certificates negotiabil-
ity and included in its coverage "a share or shares of stock in a
corporation organized under the laws of this state or of another state
whose laws are consistent with this act."' 4 In reference to creditors'
remedies, section 13 provided that no attachment or levy should be
valid unless: (1) the certificate was actually seized by the officer
making the levy or attachment; or (2) the certificate was surrendered
to the corporation which had issued it; or (3) the transfer of the
certificate by the holder was enjoined. Section 14 provided that the
creditor should be entitled to such aid from the courts as was tradi-
tionally available in equity to a creditor who sought to reach property
not subject to legal process. This proposed uniform act would termi-
nate the existing practice of making levy by notice to the corporation.
Under the USTA it was not necessary in every case to obtain
possession of the certificate itself, for section 13 provided that a levy
could be made by enjoining the holder from disposing of the certifi-
cate. Suppose that the holder of the certificate after service of the
injunction nevertheless sold the certificate to a bona fide purchaser
in the ordinary course of business. The other provisions of the USTA
would lead one to conclude that the purchaser should be protected."
Under that result, the creditor would receive no benefit from the
injunctive remedy except a cause of action against a debtor who had
already demonstrated an unwillingness to pay his debts.
Modification of the USTA by State Legislatures: Problems of
Nonuniformity
The USTA was adopted in some form by all states during the next
thirty years. The Commissioners' idea was sound for, though it made
collection more difficult for judgment creditors, it protected the mar-
ket for purchasers and lenders. The USTA was criticized, however,
in providing for the negotiability of certificates and, consequently,
requiring an attachment process which would be extremely difficult
to apply. 6 Thus, in about one-half of the states the USTA did not
13. For the text of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, see 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (1922).
14. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 22.
15. See id. §§ 1, 4-6, 8. See also Overlook v. Jerome Portland Copper Mining Co., 29 Ariz.
560, 243 P. 400 (1926).
16. Under the Act, no attachment or levy upon the shares is valid unless the certifi-
cate itself be seized or surrendered to the corporation or its transfer by the holder be
enjoined. While section 14 is designed to empower courts to give necessary aid in
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survive its passage through the legislatures in the proposed form.
California did not pass the USTA for many years after it was
proposed, and when it was enacted, the first sentence of section 13
was omitted," thereby partially retaining the pre-existing system of
levy by notice to a corporate officer. The problems that arose as a
result of California's failure to enact section 13 in the form recom-
mended by the Commissioners are illustrated in Reynolds v.
Reynolds.' A divorce decree granted the wife ownership of a speci-
fied number of corporate shares, the certificate for which was in the
possession of the husband, who was not a resident of California. The
wife brought an action to declare that the stock was hers, and the
court so decreed. Subsequently, the wife brought an action against
the corporation to compel it to issue to her a certificate for the
number of shares of which she had been adjudged the owner. The
California Supreme Court held that the corporation could not be
ordered to issue the certificate under the express terms of the USTA
(as enacted by California) because the original certificate was not
surrendered; however, the wife did own the stock, and it would be
proper for the lower court to order the corporation to pay dividends
to her and to permit her to vote the shares. This "split" ownership,
a result compelled by the failure to enact section 13 as proposed, was
highly unsatisfactory.
Other states omitted section 13 entirely, and some amended it to
conform to existing practice in the area of creditors' remedies." Some
states retained the process of levy by giving notice to the corporation,
even though they gave recognition to negotiability of corporate stock
certificates in other respects. Some states actually adopted a dual
system whereby an individual could either seize the certificate or give
notice to the corporation."0 About half of the states adopted sections
reaching the certificate, it goes without saying that an attaching process requiring a
creditor to go this far and not allowing him to stop with the corporate books will be
extremely difficult of application, and, it may be, so impractical as to remove this class
of property from a creditor's reach entirely. But such a rule is quite consistent with what
the act aims to accomplish-negotiability, so far as title is concerned, of the certificate
representing the shares, without the limitations involved in compulsory reference to
company books. Negotiability of this sort cannot easily exist side by side with the present
local attaching process. Seymour, The Proposed Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 9 CAL.
L. REV. 186, 199 (1921).
17. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2477 (West 1955).
18. 54 Cal. 2d 669, 355 P.2d 481, 7 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960).
19. See Note, Levy and Attachment of Corporate Stock, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 209 (1957).
20. Law of June 30, 1947, ch. 186, § 13, [1947] Kan. Laws (repealed 1965); Law of Aug.
5, 1943, § 13, 495, [1943] Mo. Laws (repealed 1963, effective 1965); Law of Feb. 27, 1943, ch.
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13 and 14 as they were recommended, thus requiring seizure of the
certificate or an injunction against transfer by the holder of the certif-
icate .2
The cases that followed clearly demonstrated the need for uni-
formity in this area. If a state enacted the USTA, thus making the
certificate negotiable, the certificate could be seized in any jurisdic-
tion, and the creditor would thereby have attached the res as defined
by the state of incorporation. Problems for the creditor might still
exist, however, since the foreign jurisdiction in which he seized the
certificate might have procedural devices designed to attach the own-
ership interest only by notice to the corporation. Conversely, in a
state which did not pass the USTA, thus retaining levy by notice, a
creditor might follow the appropriate procedure and sell the interest
of the debtor. The purchaser could not require the corporation to
issue a new certificate, however, because the original certificate was
out of the jurisdiction. This resulted from the fact that although the
levy by seizure section of the USTA had not been adopted, the negoti-
ability sections were adopted. Consequently, the corporation could
not be compelled to issue new certificates without surrender of the
old certificates.2 On the other hand, the creditor who successfully
seized a certificate in a state which had enacted the USTA without
115, § 13, [1943] Mont. Laws (repealed 1963); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-4307(4), 93-5810
(1947); Law of April 26, 1947, § 97, 1189 [1947] Okla. Laws (repealed 1961); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. l1, § 274 (1959).
21. Law of July 22, 1931, § 13, 483, [1940] Ala. Laws (repealed 1965); Law of June 13,
1943, ch. 56, § 15, [1943] Ariz. Laws (repealed 1968); Law of May 16, 1917, ch. 325, § 13,
[1917] Conn. Laws (repealed 1959); Law of Dec. 23, 1944, ch. 729, § 13, [1944] 58 Stat. 930
(repealed 1963); Law of June 28, 1917, Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 13, [1917] 111. Laws
(repealed 1962); Law of Feb. 26, 1923, ch. 24, § 13, [1923] Ind. Laws (repealed 1963); Law of
March 20, 1944, ch. 12, § 13, [1944] Ky. Laws (repealed 1958); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 636 (1969); Law of July 1, 1910, ch. 73, § 37m, 70, [1910] Md. Laws (repealed 1963); Law
of April 22, 1913, § 13, 106, [1913] Mich. Laws (repealed 1964); Law of April 20, 1933, ch.
331, § 13, [1933] Minn. Laws (repealed 1966); Law of March 22, 1945, ch. 188, § 13, [1945]
Nev. Laws (repealed 1967); Law of 1916 Session, ch. 191, § 13, 398, [1916] N.J. Laws (repealed
1963); Law of May 17, 1913, ch. 600, § 174, [1913] N.Y. Laws (repealed 1964); Law of March
9, 1935, ch. 239, § 13, [1935] Ore. Laws (repealed 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-317
(1970); Law of Feb. 9, 1921, ch. 159, § 13, [1921] S.D. Laws (repealed 1967); Law of April
II, 1925, ch. 91, § 13, [1925] Tenn. Laws (repealed 1964); Law of June 1, 1943, ch. 397, § 13,
[1943] Tex. Laws (repealed 1961); Law of July I, 1927, ch. 55, § 13, [1927] Utah Laws
(repealed 1966); Law of March 30, 1956, ch. 428, § 13.1-413, [1956] Va. Laws (repealed 1966);
Law of April 18, 1923, ch. 53, § 20, [1923] W. Va. Laws (repealed 1964); Law of Oct. 20, 1939,
ch. 513, § 36, [1939] Wis. Laws (repealed 1965).
22. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 54 Cal. 2d 669, 355 P.2d 481, 7 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960); cf.
Rony v. Yucca Water Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 613, 33 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
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any modification would have accomplished nothing if the corporation
issuing the stock certificate were incorporated in a state that retained
the concept of the share, rather than the certificate, as the ownership
interest.2 Likewise, an attempt to secure the shares by notice to the
corporation in a state that had adopted the uniform version of section
13 was ineffectiveY Further problems arose when the court had juris-
diction over the person of the debtor, but not the certificate or the
corporation." If the creditor and debtor resided in a state which had
adopted the USTA without modification, but the state of incorpora-
tion of the issuer of the debtor's stock was a notice state, the creditor
could not get jurisdiction over the shares in his and the debtor's state.
Procedures Under the USTA for Seizure of the Certificate
The creditors in states which enacted the USTA as recommended
had to determine the proper procedure under the USTA for obtaining
the certificate itself. In Illinois, it was held proper to seek an injunc-
tion against the holder and to follow the injunction with an execution
sale32 The purchaser became entitled to a conveyance of the certifi-
cate from the holder or a contempt citation against him for failure
so to transfer. On the other hand, it was held proper in Pennsylvania
to enjoin the corporation, holder, and judgment debtor from transfer-
ring the certificate and then to apply for an order of sale.27 A subse-
quent Pennsylvania decision held that for this procedure to be proper
it was not necessary to issue an execution first to demonstrate that
the certificate could not be seized.2
When the certificate is pledged to a lender or held by a broker in
a margin account, is there a proper procedure enabling the judgment
creditor to reach the debtor's interest? No remedy by garnishment is
available because corporate shares are not capable of seizure and sale
under the process of garnishment .2 The proper procedure under such
23. See United States v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 244 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1965); cf
Wirt Franklin Petroleum Corp. v. Gruen, 139 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1944) (de facto domicile not
in state of incorporation).
24. See, e.g., Claude Neon, Inc. v. Birrell, 177 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1959): Westerman
v. Gilbert, 119 F. Supp. 335 (D.R.I. 1953).
25. See Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, N.V. v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
26. Trade Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Schwartz, 303 III. App. 165, 24 N.E.2d 892 (1940).
27. Henson & Co. v. Stetser, 26 Pa. Dist. 155 (C.P. 1917).
28. Bell v. Feeney, 41 Pa. D. & C. 486 (C.P. 1941).
29. An attempted garnishment against a lender who admittedly had excess collateral for
payment of a note was dismissed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Jordan v. Lavin, 319
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circumstances is a bill to reach and apply. Under this bill, the debtor
is ordered to pay the judgment, and upon failure to do so, his shares
are sold by a special master. This is a proper proceeding whether or
not the creditor has demonstrated that the debtor has possession of
the shares; furthermore, this procedure does not conflict with the
terms of the USTA20 Does the service of a writ of garnishment
constitute an injunction against transfer by the garnishee so as to be
within the third method for a valid attachment in section 13 of the
USTA? The answer should be "yes," because the writ tells the gar-
nishee not to dispose of any property of the judgment debtor until
further order of the court.' However, since the creditor is seeking
the debtor's equity and not the pledged certificates, the better view is
that garnishment of a pledgee does not come within the terms of the
USTA.32 Thus, a notice levy against a broker should be valid even
in a state that has enacted the USTA.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that if the certifi-
cate of stock is in a safety deposit box belonging to the debtor, it is
possible to execute upon the contents of the box by serving the bank
with the writ of execution.3 However, a Pennsylvania statute
specifically refers to a bailee as subject to the writ of execution al-
though the corresponding statute35 on attachment garnishment does
not so provide .3  Hodes v. Hodes,37 an Oregon case, presents a
Mass. 362, 66 N.E.2d 41 (1946). Cf Pierce, Wulbern, Murphey Corp. v. Riverside Bank, 203
So. 2d 177 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
30. See Central Mortgage Co. v. Buff, 278 Mass. 233, 179 N.E. 628 (1932). But see Frost
v. Davis, 288 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1961) (this case can be distinguished because the garnishee
was-probably not the holder).
31. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 540 (West 1954); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 6214 (McKinney
1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, § 21 (Smith-Hurd 1963); TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 4084 (Vernon
1966).
32. See Tryon v. Silverstein, 10 Ariz. App. 25, 455 P.2d 474 (1969).'
The levy . . . was not on the stock certificates, but on Sherwood's equity in his account
with the plaintiff. The plaintiff held the stock as security for Sherwood's debt to it. As
a pledgee it had the right, despite service of the sequestration order, to possession of
the certificates and was not under compulsion to surrender them to the sheriff. Horn-
blower & Weeks v. Sherwood, 124 N.Y.S.2d 322, 327 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 282 App. Div.
931, 125 N.Y.S.2d 647, stay granted mem. 306 N.Y. 672, 116 N.E.2d 500 (1953), affd,
307 N.Y. 204, 120 N.E.2d 790 (1954); quoted with approval in Gilman v. Sandow, 29
Misc. 2d 1078, 220 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1961).
33. Williams v. Ricca, 324 Pa. 33, 187 A. 722 (1936). See also Moore, Enforcement of
Judgments Against Personalty in the Custody of Third Parties, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 56, 65.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2115 (1967).
35. Id. § 2265, suspended in part by id., PA. R. Civ. P. §§ 3241,49 (1967).
36. 324 Pa. at 37-39, 187 A. at 724-25.
37. 176 Ore. 102, 155 P.2d 564 (1945).
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somewhat different situation. In Hodes, the court had personal juris-
diction over the debtor, who resided in Oregon; the certificates, how-
ever, were in a Washington safety deposit box. The lower court en-
tered an order requiring the debtor to deliver the certificates to the
sheriff within five days for the purpose of sale. On appeal the Oregon
Supreme Court affirmed and noted that the order did not require thejudgment debtor to go to Washington to procure the certificates of
stock and then deliver them to the sheriff in Oregon, for the judgment
debtor could procure these certificates without leaving Oregon. 8 The
court added that if the debtor did not supply the certificates as or-
dered, the lower court would have jurisdiction under section 14 of the
USTA to appoint a receiver and require the judgment debtor to
transfer the certificates to such receiver, or to execute any other
document necessary to enable the receiver to obtain the certificates.
When the certificate is in the debtor's possession, it is proper for
the creditor to enjoin transfer by the debtor without prior resort to
an execution. The creditor may also enjoin the issuing corporation
from transferring the certificate. Although the relevant clause in sec-
tion 13 refers only to "transfer by the holder," the provision does not
specifically preclude enjoining other parties. 9 The most probable
reason that an execution is not required prior to the issuance of an
injunction against the holder of the certificate is that under an execu-
tion in the civil process of levy the sheriff has no authority to seize
the certificate from the debtor against his will.
If the judgment debtor has fraudulently conveyed the stock to
another individual, the creditor can obtain relief under a creditor's
bill or supplementary proceedings. In Rioux v. Cronin,40 a Massachu-
setts case, certain stock was held by the wife of the debtor. The
creditor brought a creditor's bill and secured an injunction against
transfer by the holder. In an action brought after the death of the
judgment debtor, the court held that under section 13 of the USTA
there was an effective levy and, consequently, the lien of a creditor's
bill survived the death of the debtor. Similarly, a judgment creditor
in Pennsylvania enjoined transfer by the debtor and the issuing corpo-
ration and, in addition, secured an order that the debtor execute an
assignment to the sheriff of his rights in certain additional shares
38. Id. at 116, 155 P.2d at 570 (1945). But see Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, N.V.
v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
39. Jaski v. Leider, 34 Pa. D. & C. 480, 484-85 (C.P. 1939).
40. 222 Mass. 131, 109 N.E. 898 (1915).
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which were found to be property of the judgment debtor but which
stood in the names of others. 4' In New York, supplemental proceed-
ings were available to secure a turn-over order against the nominal
holders of certificates which were found to be the property of the
debtor.4"
An Evaluation of the USTA
The USTA was excellent in conception. Had it in fact remained
a uniform act after adoption, it would have eliminated most of the
problems of creditors, purchasers, and lenders. Unfortunately, the
lack of adoption in the recommended form resulted in problems of
conflicts and jurisdiction for creditors and insecurity about the title
of certificates for purchasers and lenders. But even if the USTA had
been uniform in fact, the third alternative of section 13, which al-
lowed an effective levy by service of an injunction on the holders,
increased the possibilities of litigation as a consequence of sales made
in contempt of court. Lack of litigation reaching appellate courts
indicated, however, that it was rare for a holder to successfully trans-
fer in contempt of the court order;4 3 consequently, had the statute
been uniform in fact, it would have accomplished at inception its goal
to protect both purchasers and creditors. With half a century of
experience under the USTA, the Commissioners were well prepared
to understand and correct the problems of the USTA when they
assembled to draft Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
ARTICLE 8 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was designed
41. See Tong Y. Chin v. Chin Wing Teung, 34 Pa. D. & C. 4 (C.P. 1938).
42. See First Small Business Invest. Corp. v. Zaretsky, 52 Misc. 2d 375, 275 N.Y.S.2d 960
(Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd, 28 App. Div. 874, 282 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1967) (debtor's ownership not
shown). Cf Ballin v. Ballin, 138 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (cannot reach certificate in hands
of third party by levy without seizure or injunction).
A case decided by the Illinois Court of Appeals under the USTA concluded that the filing
of a creditor's bill constituted an injunction within the meaning of section 13:
While ordinarily plaintiffs do act promptly to sequester "discovered" assets and while
the plaintiff herein might have resorted to the interlocutory remedies of injunction or
receivership to prevent the transfer and delivery of the certificate of stock by the bank
to Wilcox, in our opinion she was under no obligation to do so. Pritchard v. Wilcox,
314 III. App. 132, 137, 40 N.E.2d 831, 833 (1942).
When the bank admitted possession of defendant's property, that property came within the
court's jurisdiction and the bank could not thereafter change the situation without permission
of the court.
43. Cf Overlook v. Jerome Portland Copper Mining Co., 29 Ariz. 560, 243 P. 400 (1926).
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to replace the USTA, to improve upon it, and, hopefully, to make
the law in fact uniform with regard to creditors' remedies. Section
8-317 is based upon sections 13 and 14 of the USTA but is not
identical. It will be recalled that under section 13 of the USTA there
were three ways in which to make a valid levy: actual seizure of the
certificate; service upon the corporation when the certificate had been
surrendered to the corporation; and an injunction against the holder
of the certificate. Section 8-317(1) clearly reiterates the first two
procedures in providing for the methods of valid levy under the Code,
but the third alternative is omitted. It is apparent that the drafters
of the Code intended to avoid the problems arising from the prior law
which permitted a valid levy by enjoining the holder from transfer of
the certificate. While the injunction procedure is referred to in section
8-317(2) as one of the means whereby the creditor can secure the
assistance of a court of appropriate jurisdiction, the issuance of an
injunction does not of itself constitute a levy. The creditor can secure
the certificate without seizure only if the certificate has been surren-
dered to the issuing corporation."4 Since valid levy can be made only
by actual seizure or surrender of the certificate to the issuing corpora-
tion, Article 8 also protects the purchaser or lender who extends
money or credit on the face of the certificate itself in the ordinary
course of business.
Interpretations of Section 8-317
The few reported cases under section 8-317 indicate that the
courts will read the section literally. In Neifeld v. Steinberg,"5 a sher-
iff attempted to attach certain stock held by a broker in Philadelphia.
In the original proceeding the sheriff did not seize the certificate, but
simply served notice upon the broker. A subsequent writ of foreign
attachment was issued, however, and the sheriff did take possession
of the certificate. In holding that the first abortive attempt to secure
the certificate was not res judicata upon the subsequent levy, the
Third Circuit stated:
The reason why [UCC] § 8-317 requires a party to manually seize securities
44. Comment I under section 8-317 of the Code expressly makes this point referring to
Hodes v. Hodes, 176 Ore. 102, 155 P.2d 564 (1945), as an example of the proper procedure to
reach the certificate under section 8-317(2), see notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text, but
notes that the procedure is not operative as an effective levy. In the Hodes situation, there could
be no levy under section 8-317 until the sheriff actually acquired physical possession of the
certificate.
45. 438 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1971).
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in order to effect a valid attachment is to foreclose all possibility of the security
finding its way into a transferee's hands after an attempted attachment has
been made. This policy has already been vindicated for we take judicial notice
that the sheriff manually seized the securities . . ..
Two earlier Pennsylvania cases had made it clear that under the UCC
nothing less than actual seizure would be sufficient to effectuate a
valid levy.47
Enactment of Article 8 by the State Legislatures
Assuming that the UCC will be construed in substantially the
same way by different courts, creditors' rights in domestic stocks
would be well protected if all of the jurisdictions had enacted Article
8 of the UCC, without amending the provisions discussed herein. At
the present writing all states except Louisiana have enacted the
UCC48 and only two states, California and Delaware, have amended
section 8-3 17.1 The modifications by Delaware are of particular im-
46. Id. at 432.
47. DeShong v. Cody, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 109 (C.P. 1964); Ellison v. Mitchell, 26 Pa. D. &
C.2d 45 (C.P. 1961). In both cases, the sheriff served garnishment upon a third party having
possession of the certificate, but in neither case did the sheriff obtain possession of the certifi-
cate. In each instance the court held that the attempted levy was ineffective under the Uniform
Commercial Code.
A sheriff probably cannot take possession of a certificate of stock under the garnishment
statutes, since most of the procedures simply instruct the garnishee, after service of the writ,
to file an answer at a given time stating what property or credits of the debtor the garnishee
holds. Such provisions would need a substantial judicial gloss to be construed to permit the
sheriff to seize property in the hands of the garnishee. Cf. Frost v. Davis, 288 F.2d 497 (5th
Cir. 1961). This does not mean, however, that certificates of stock are not available to creditors
when they are in the hands of third parties. Section 8-317(2) suggests that in those cases where
it is not possible to obtain seizure of the certificate, other traditional remedies, including the
injunction, are to be given by the court. An example of an unsuccessful use of the proper
procedure is the recent New York case of Art-Camera-Pix, Inc. v. Cinecom Corp., 64 Misc.
2d 764, 315 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1970). In that case the judgment creditor restrained the
corporation, which had issued warrants to purchase stock; it also served garnishment upon the
corporation and commenced supplemental proceedings against both the judgment debtor and
the corporation. The court found that the procedure was proper but that the creditor's action
must fail because the rights in the stock warrants had been assigned by the debtor before the
date of the judgment creditor's action.
48. Louisiana enacted the USTA in 1910, with section 13 in the uniform version as recom-
mended by the Commissioners. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 12:636 (1969). Under that statute the
certificate is the tangible representative of the shares, and it may be taken by legal process in
other states under the forum state's code and rules of civil procedure. Therefore, it makes little
difference to creditors in other states that Louisiana did not enact the UCC provisions in
reference to corporate stock.
49. California added to section 8-317(1) the following: "in the case of a security held in
escrow pursuant to the provisions of the Corporate Securities Law, a copy of the writ and a
notice that the securities are attached or levied upon in pursuance of such writ is served upon
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portance since many businesses are incorporated in Delaware as a
result of the historical development of the law of incorporation. The
list of businesses incorporated in Delaware includes large corpora-
tions which have no other substantial connection with Delaware. The
stock certificates of these corporations are found in all areas of the
United States.
Unfortunately for creditors, the Delaware legislature elected not
to enact any part of section 8-317(1). In addition, Delaware provided
that the adoption of Article 8 shall not repeal, amend, or in any way
change the existing Delaware law with respect to levy and attachment
of corporate stock.50 Since Delaware has enacted without any modifi-
the escrow holder .. " CAL. CoMMNI. CODE § 8-317(b)(1) (West 1964). This variation will
not create problems similar to those arising from the lack of uniformity in the enactment of
the USTA, because this variation applies only to securities which are no longer in circulation.
Thus, no danger of a subsequent bona fide purchaser or lender exists.
50. The Delaware version reads:
Nothing contained in this title shall repeal, amend or in any way effect the provisions
of sections 169 and 324, title 8, or sections 365 and 366, and chapter 35, title 10; and to
the extent that any provision of this title is inconsistent with such sections, sections 169
and 324, title 8, and 365 and 366 and chapter 35, title 10, shall be controlling. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 5A, § 8317, Comment (West 1970).
Section 169, referred to in section 8-317(1), provides that for all purposes of title, action,
attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in Delaware, the situs of the owner-
ship of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of Delaware shall be
regarded as in Delaware. Id. tit. 8, § 169 (Supp. 1968). Section 324 provides that corporate
shares may be attached and sold under legal process and that the purchaser at the sale under
legal process takes as good a title as the debtor had to such shares. Id. § 324. Sections 365
and 366 provide for service by publication upon a non-resident, id. tit. 10, §§ 365-66, and
chapter 35 is the chapter on attachments. Id. ch. 35. The Delaware Study Comment indicates
that the specific references to sections in the Delaware version of this UCC section were inserted
to assure that the existing law would not be changed by enactment of the Code. See Note,
Attachment of Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Delaware and the (/niforn
Stock Transfer Act, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1579 (1960).
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code rejected the Delaware
amendment, giving the following reasons:
The amendment in this case has the effect of permitting attachment of shares of stock
of Delaware corporations and the sale of those shares without the obtaining of possession
of the certificates and without any personal service bn the registered owner of the shares,
even in the case of non-resident owners . . . .These provisions are fundamentally
contrary to the entire rationale of Article 8 and particularly Section 8-317 which, as a
matter of basic policy, base rights of ownership and attachment in major part upon the
certificates. Since shares of a Delaware corporation may be attached and sold without
physical possession of or any reference to certificates representing the shares, the Dela-
ware provisions can only have the effect of substantially destroying the value of certifi-
cates as evidence of ownership and other rights. Delaware has established a position as
an appropriate state in which to incorporate and, presumably, desires to retain for itself
substantially exclusive jurisdiction as to ownership and control of shares in Delaware
corporations. This is its privilege. However, if by the same policy certificates for shares
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cations the remaining parts of Article 8, the effect of the legislation
is to protect purchasers and lenders, regardless of where they pur-
chase or lend. The certificate of stock in a Delaware corporation is a
negotiable instrument by statute," and the purchaser or lender takes
free of ordinary defenses so long as he meets the tests of Article 8.
But can a creditor whose debtor owns shares in a Delaware corpora-
tion seize the certificate by legal process in New York or Pennsyl-
vania and thereafter cause the certificate to be sold in satisfaction of
his debt? The Delaware statute states that in the event of an attempt
to seize corporate shares by legal process the situs of the shares is
Delaware.5 2 Therefore, the court in New York or Pennsylvania would
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. It seems
strange that Delaware can create shares which can travel under the
certificate for most purposes, but if a creditor levies upon that certifi-
cate, then the situs of the shares reverts to Delaware. What Delaware
has done is to require that all creditors who would realize upon shares
in a Delaware corporation owned by their debtor come to Delaware
to litigate. One might also conclude that the bar and the legislature
of Delaware were not worried about that "veritable flood of litiga-
tion" which has concerned so many judges!
Coverage of Corporate Stock by Article 8
Upon enacting the USTA, most states repealed earlier statutes
subjecting corporate shares to legal process. When the states enacted
the UCC, it was recommended that they repeal the USTA.5 3 Thus,
the question arises as to what corporate stocks are covered by Article
8. This question is important, for if there are stocks not covered by
Article 8 and a state has repealed the USTA, then one must deter-
mine what law would govern the levy and sale of such stock.
Most of the pre-USTA statutes in the various states applied to
shares in a domestic or foreign corporation. Section 22 of the USTA
of stock of Delaware corporations are vulnerable to attachment and complete transfer
of ownership entirely apart from the certificate and without the knowledge of the holder
of any certificate, disadvantages to the policy substantially outweigh any benefits. This
is certainly true in the case of purchasers or holders of certificates and would seem to
be equally true in the case of Delaware corporations and the state of Delaware itself. In
addition to the destruction of the uniformity otherwise provided by Article 8, the Board
considers the Delaware amendment to be highly unsound in policy. COMMISSION ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REPORT OF PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD 104 (1966).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 8-105(l) (1971).
52. Id. tit. 8, § 169.
53. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-102(I).
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defines shares as "stock in a corporation organized under the laws
of this state or of another state whose laws are consistent with this
act."54 The drafters of Article 8 of the UCC were concerned that any
definition might exclude types of securities that either were in exist-
ence or which might develop in the future, and they did not want to
freeze the definition so far as new types of securities were concerned.55
For this reason they decided upon a functional definition which brings
under the provisions of Article 8 any security, regardless of its name,
which meets certain tests. A security which is included in the provi-
sions of Article 8 is functionally defined in section 8-102(1) as follows:
In this division unless the context otherwise requires (a) a "security" is an
instrument which (i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and (ii) is of a type
commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recog-
nized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment;
and (iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class
or series of instruments; and (iv) evidences a share, participation or other
interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the is-
suer.0
This definition does not expressly refer to corporate stock, but it is
apparent that if any issue of corporate stock meets the four tests it
will be a "security" within the meaning of Article 8 and will be
governed in turn by section 8-317. There is no doubt that stocks listed
upon any exchange are included within the term "security." Likewise,
any registered stock traded in an over-the-counter market, whether
it is national or city-wide, would clearly be included within the defini-
tion .5 There is considerable disagreement, however, over the question
of whether the definition includes all corporate stock. One commen-
tator has suggested that the definition may not be all inclusive in
relation to stock:58 Although section 8-102(1) defines "security" for
the purpose of applicability of Article 8 broadly enough to include
both stocks and bonds, the definition is limited to stock "commonly
dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recog-
54. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 22.
55. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102, Comment I.
56. Id. § 8-102(l).
57. The official comment to section 8-102(1) states:
The definition of "security" is functional rather than formal, and it is believed will cover
anything which securities markets, including not only the organized exchanges but as
well the "over-the-counter" markets, are likely to regard as suitable for trading. Id. § 8-
102(1), Comment 1.
58. Rosenthal, Remedies in Disputes Arising Out of Agreements to Buy and Sell Busi-
nesses. 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 825, 826 n.4 (1971).
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nized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment . . . ."- Consequently, stock in a closely held corpora-
tion may not come within the Article 8 definition.60 On the other
hand, it has been suggested that "Article 8 will apply to a very broad
spectrum of instruments, given that the instrument is issued 'in bearer
or registered form' and otherwise complies with the broad functional
definition stated in section 8-102. It will apply to the stock of even
the smallest family corporation . "- Another commentator has
concluded that:
A security meets the requirement if it is "of a type commonly dealt in" on
the organized markets. This does not mean that the particular security must
in fact be listed on a stock exchange or traded on a market. Indeed, because
of transfer restrictions, it may never leave the hands of the original owners,
as in a closely held corporation. Despite the fact that the security may be
surrounded by transfer restrictions and purchase options, a close corporation
common stock . . . is nonetheless "of a type" which could be traded should
the corporation elect to "go public." Thus, the test is whether the security
could be publicly traded, not whether it is .... 12
What did the drafters of the section mean when they used "of a type
commonly dealt in"? This commentator clearly suggests that the
phrase includes all corporate stock of a kind that could "go public"
whether or not this ever happens or was ever contemplated.
These varying interpretations of section 8-102(1) illustrate that a
legitimate question exists as to whether all corporate stock is included
within the definition of "security" as used in Article 8, and that the
answer to this question must be determined by interpreting the mean-
ing of the phrase "of a type commonly dealt in." If the phrase means
"all stock" because all stock could be "dealt in" if certain require-
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102(1).
60. Rosenthal, supra note 58, at 826 n.4. Another writer suggests that stock memberships
in a nonproprietary golf club, although held to be securities for regulatory purposes, would not
come within the definition of "security" for the purposes of Article 8. J. SMITH, 2 CALIFORNIA
CObMERCIAL LAW § 13.5 (1965).
61. Huck & McCartin, The Illinois Uniform Commercial Code: Some Observations and
Comments on Article 8-Investment Securities, 50 ILL. B.J. 406, 407 (1962). The commenta-
tors also note that the use of the word "investment" in the title to Article 8 does not prevent
the Article from applying to stock in a close corporation. Id. But this analysis is not really
addressed to the definition of a "security" given in section 8-102(I) of the Code.
62. Folk, Some Problems Under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 ARIZ. L.
REV. 193, 200-01 (1964). Other writers have discussed the definition of "security" but have
generally concentrated upon the inclusion of new types of securities, and not upon any possible
exclusion of corporate stock. See Israels, Investment Security Problems-Article 8 of the
UCC, II How. L.J. 120 (1965); Wyatt, Investment Securities-Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 48 Ky. L.J. 333 (1960).
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ments were met, then the question is of no consequence. However, if
"commonly dealt in" refers to corporate stock which is of a kind and
status to be presently "dealt in," then a substantial number of unre-
gistered stocks would not meet the functional test of the section.
Would it be in the interest of any party to argue that a particular
corporate stock was not included within the definition of Article 8?
Certainly purchasers and lenders want the protections of the statute
and would not be likely to raise the issue. But what about a judgment
creditor who is seeking satisfaction of his judgment? If such a creditor
were to succeed in convincing a court that the particular stock was
not of a type "commonly dealt in," then it would follow that section
8-317 would not apply to his case because that section speaks only
of a "security" as defined in the UCC. If the argument were to
advance to that point, the court would be faced with the question of
what law applies to an interest in a corporation represented by a
certificate which was not a "security." If prior statutes were repealed
by the enactment of each subsequent statute, then the common law
would apply to the case. If common law were applied, the probable
rule would be that legal process does not reach such an intangible
chose in action, but the interest can be reached in equity with or
without the physical presence of the certificate. On the other hand, if
the earlier statutes had not been specifically repealed, the creditor
might be able to reach the interest by a simple notice to the corpora-
tion issuing the stock, or he might be able to enjoin the holder under
the USTA.
CONCLUSION
Judgment creditors attempting to satisfy their judgment from
corporate shares owned by the debtor are faced with two problems.
First, all corporate stock may not be covered by the provisions of
Article 8. This might be favorable to the creditor if he could be
certain which stock is and which is not included. On the other hand,
if it is found that some stocks are not within the Article 8 definition,
there may be no procedure for reaching such stock by legal process
under available statutes. If it is the intention of the legislatures to
include all corporate stock in Article 8, it might be well to provide
explicitly that a "security" is corporate stock and any other instru-
ment which comes within the meaning of the functional test presently
found in section 8-102(1). The fact that this was not done, especially
in light of the experience with the USTA, gives some weight to the
conclusion that all corporate stocks were not intended to be included.
The second problem area is the lack of uniformity in the law
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applicable to shares of stock in businesses incorporated in the United
States. The difficulty is created because Delaware has not accepted
the provisions of Article 8 on attachment and levy upon securities.
The problem is enhanced by the fact that a large number of national
corporations are incorporated in Delaware.
This situation leaves several choices. First, the federal govern-
ment can include this aspect of the regulation of corporate shares in
the ever increasing package of securities regulations already existing.
Although this seems very logical, it runs contrary to the concept of
the local nature of creditors' remedies. New thoughts in the area of
creditors' remedies may appear, however, because of recent Supreme
Court cases holding that certain state creditors' remedies violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment63 and because of the
increasing interest in uniform federal exemptions for debtors. 4 Sec-
ond, other states could persuade Delaware to follow the uniform
policy established in the UCC. This is not likely to occur, however,
because pressure has already been unsuccessfully exerted through the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Third, the corporations
which have incorporated in Delaware could be persuaded to rein-
corporate in other states. This will not happen because the issuing
corporation has no direct concern in creditors' problems; conse-
quently, such a decision would have to be made in response to other
corporate interests. Finally, judgment creditors can continue to ex-
pend time and money in order to levy upon shares that their debtors
own in Delaware corporations.
Thus, it appears that the lack of uniformity in the law will remain
unless the federal government chooses to regulate the attachment or
levy of corporate stock in businesses incorporated in the United
States. Whatever the method of regulation, it should provide a swift,
uniform, and economical means for creditors to subject this asset to
their judgment.
63. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.
395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment).
64. See Countryman, supra note 2; Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-
77 (1970).
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